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Social trust is a crucial ingredient for successful collective action. What causes social trust
to develop, however, remains poorly understood. The quality of political institutions has
been proposed as a candidate driver and has been shown to correlate with social trust.
We show that this relationship is causal. We begin by documenting a positive correlation
between quality of institutions, measured by embezzlement, and social trust using survey
data. We then take the investigation to the laboratory: We first exogenously expose
subjects to different levels of institutional quality in an environment mimicking public
administration embezzlement. We then measure social trust among the participants using
a trust game. Coherent with our survey evidence, individuals exposed to low institutional
quality trust significantly less.
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INTRODUCTION
Social or generalized trust is a crucial ingredient to overcome social dilemmas: It is a necessary
component of public good provision, tax compliance, pollution abatement and the maintenance
of sound and constructive political and economic relationships, to name a few. Social trust
stretches beyond individuals who know each other or meet face-to-face. Modern day impersonal
relationships and transactions make trust among perfect strangers as essential as ever.1 Iden-
tifying the determinants of social trust, thus uncovering potential policy instruments to spur
voluntary collective action and cooperation among strangers, remains one of the key problems
in economics, political science and social psychology. This study relies on a novel experimental
paradigm to make a step further in the resolution of this decades-long debate by document-
ing the existence of a causal nexus between quality of the institutional environment and social
trust.
Previous research documents that high levels of social trust and social capital are generally
attributes of societies characterised by high quality in their institutional environment. In the
Nordic countries, known for their high quality of government and low levels of corruption, more
than 60% of the population consistently reports that most people can be trusted. In countries
suffering from widespread corruption, such as Brazil, the Philippines, and Romania, this percent-
age drops to less than 10% (Ortiz-Ospina and Roser, 2020: data from 2014). However, the causal
link tying institutional quality and social trust is neither straightforward, nor unequivocally es-
tablished. Some scholars claim that generalized trust precedes institutional quality: Trusting
and law abiding societies attaching high moral costs to corruption are capable of putting high
quality institutions in place (e.g., Bjørnskov, 2010). Others hold instead the opposite view that
stronger institutions create the pre-conditions for generalized trust to develop (e.g., Spadaro
et al., 2020; Rothstein, 2013).
We here theorise, and provide evidence for, a positive and causal relationship between the qual-
ity of an institutional environment and social trust. In doing so, we accompany correlational
evidence from survey data, documenting a negative relationship between public sector embezzle-
ment and social trust, with experimental evidence from an environment mimicking embezzlement
at the administrative level.
1Generalised social trust is not a virtue or asset for the individual per se. Trusting others in environments in which most people
are untrustworthy can be very costly and even dangerous. Social trust is a genuine “collective good”: It only is an asset for the
individual and for society (“social capital”) if most people behave in a trustworthy manner.
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In the first part of our investigation, we establish an association between social trust and insti-
tutional quality. We first measure institutional quality as administrative and executive embez-
zlement across countries using data from the World Value Survey, the European Value Survey,
and the Quality of Government Institute and then, more broadly, with the European Quality of
Government Index across European NUTS2 regions using data from the Quality of Government
Institute and Eurostat.
In the second part, we test for the causal effect of institutional quality on trust by conducting
a laboratory experiment. We first expose the participants to exogenously varied levels of in-
stitutional quality, operationalised as the ability of the institutional setup to constrain corrupt
behavior on behalf of public administrators and prevent them from embezzling public funds. To
do so, we implement a modified public good game in which the redistribution of the amount
contributed by the group to the public good is made responsibility of an individual acting as
a public administrator. Our experimental conditions vary the probability with which attempts
at embezzling the group’s funds will be successfully detected and prevented. We then mea-
sure social trust among subjects who have experienced institutions of different quality using a
stranger matching protocol. In other words, groups are broken up after the public good phase
and subjects re-matched in stranger pairs for the trust game phase.2
This experimental design therefore allows us to directly observe, under hard test conditions but
in a simple and parsimonious experimental paradigm, the impact of institutional quality on
generalised social trust: Reciprocity motives between the public officials and the group mem-
bers, and among group members themselves, is excluded. Moreover, our analysis allows us to
remove expectations about other group members’ cooperativeness and about the administrator’s
embezzlement behaviours as confounds of institutional quality in driving social trust.
In line with previous research, we find that exposure to administrative environments charac-
terised by higher institutional quality systematically leads to higher levels of social trust. In the
first part of our investigation we show that the relationship between embezzlement and social
trust is significantly negative, strong, and robust. In the second part we show that these corre-
lational findings are mirrored by experimental results identifying a positive causal link running
from institutional quality to social trust.
In the next two sections, we review the literature and introduce our theory. We then investigate
the correlational link between institutional quality and trust across countries and explore its
causality. The final section concludes and suggests avenues for future research.
PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Empirical studies in political science, economics and sociology have tested for the association
between institutional quality and social trust. You (2018) provide a comprehensive summary
of the major works for the last several decades and conclude that there is strong and robust
evidence for a positive correlation between the two (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005; Kumlin and
Rothstein, 2005; Bjørnskov, 2007; Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009; Charron and Rothstein, 2016;
Knack and Zak, 2003; Zak and Knack, 2001; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Delhey and Newton, 2005:
to name a few).
The causal arguments behind the observed association are divided. One group of scholars claims
that social trust leads to higher institutional quality and lower corruption (e.g., Uslaner, 2002,
2Our investigation is limited to providing evidence of the causal impact of institutional quality on social trust, while we remain
agnostic on whether causation also runs in the opposite direction. We leave this question for future research.
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2008; Bjørnskov, 2010; Graeff and Svendsen, 2013; Wroe et al., 2013; Lambsdorff, 2002). An-
other group of scholars adopts instead an institutional standpoint and argues that it is higher
institutional quality that causes social trust to increase (e.g., Rothstein, 2000; Rothstein and
Stolle, 2008; Rothstein and Eek, 2009; Dinesen and Hooghe, 2010; Dinesen, 2012a; Rothstein,
2013; Sønderskov and Dinesen, 2014). The numerous confounding factors and the slow moving
nature of the variables under investigation, therefore, prevented scholars from establishing nei-
ther a firm causal link between institutional quality and social trust nor its direction, despite
the intense and decade-long academic debate.
Only few studies that take institutional approach to understanding the causes of social trust
have approached its identification using experimental methods. Among these, Rothstein and Eek
(2009) conduct an experiment among graduate students in Sweden and Romania and find that
if individuals experience corruption when interacting with healthcare services or police during
their travels in an unknown place, they lose both trust in these agencies and trust in people in
general. Peter Dinesen and his colleagues have carried out a range of natural experiments with
immigrants from low trust/high corruption countries to high trust/low corruption Denmark.
They find that both second-generation and first-generation immigrants to Denmark display
higher levels of trust after having lived a number of years in a country characterised by higher
institutional quality than their country of origin, and they argue that this finding implies a causal
effect of institutions on social trust (Dinesen, 2012a,b; Dinesen and Hooghe, 2010; Nannestad
et al., 2014; Sønderskov and Dinesen, 2014). The endogeneities plaguing cross-cultural, cross-
national research make it, however, hard to clearly pinpoint the causal link behind the observed
results. As You (2018: p. 11) note in conclusion to their survey of the literature, more “empirical
tests to determine whether corruption really impacts social trust to a considerable extent” are
needed.3
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
This paper takes an institutional approach to understanding social trust, focusing on the state
as a determinant of social capital (Levi, 1998; Tarrow, 1996). According to this view, social trust
comes as a consequence of impartial, uncorrupt, honest and trustworthy institutions (Rothstein,
2000, 2011: among others).4
Among the tools a State can adopt in order to spur trust among its citizens is its legal sys-
tems. Legal systems ensure reliable contracts, secure rights and enforce rules that sanction
non-compliance, protect minorities and support participation (Levi, 1998; Spadaro et al., 2020).
Should a state be unable to enforce the observance of contracts and rights, citizens might be
skeptical that others will adhere to the prescribed codes of behavior (Rothstein and Stolle,
2008).
Institutions can moreover influence individuals’ sense of identification with the group which
is governed by these same institutions (Wichardt, 2008; Martinangeli and Martinsson, 2020).
Individuals who perceive the institutions as being fair, impartial and honest are more likely to
feel a stronger sense of group belonging and make social (group) goals one’s own (Wenzel, 2007).
For instance, De Cremer et al. (2005) show that inclusiveness and membership feeling increase
trust among group members. Similarly, Ostrom (2005: p. 74) demonstrates that individuals with
3Scholars studying drivers of social trust also argued that trust may be found among those involved in corruption and those
who profit from an unregulated social environment. Thereby, widespread corruption can be associated with higher overall levels of
social trust. Trust that becomes functional in corrupt networks, however, is considered to be particularised rather than generalized
trust (Uslaner, 2002, 2008) and is beyond the scope of this paper.
4By institutions we mean “rules of the game in a society”, a definition suggested by North (1990).
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a stronger sense of group affiliation are more likely to trust others. By increasing identification
with the group, high-quality institutions are therefore likely to increase social trust.
We hypothesize that institutions of higher quality, or institutions that are more capable of
harnessing public officials and administrators’ behaviours, have a positive and causal effect on
social trust:
Hypothesis. Higher institutional quality leads to higher social trust
CORRELATIONAL EVIDENCE ON INSTITUTIONAL QUAL-
ITY AND SOCIAL TRUST
Before exploring the causal link between institutional quality and social trust in an experimen-
tal setting, we investigate the association between institutional quality and social trust across
countries with the available survey data. While this exercise does not allow us to establish the
causal link due to the slow-moving nature of our variables, data availability, and confounding
factors, it lays the motivation and the premises for the experimental analysis performed later
on, and provides us with useful insights into real world regularities against which to interpret
the results there emerging.
For the purpose of this analysis, we use several major datasets available online. First, we use
the World Value Survey, which allows us to investigate the relationship between institutional
quality, measured as public sector and executive embezzlement, and social trust around the
world. Second, we zoom our focus in on Europe and explore the variation in social trust across
the European NUTS2 regions using the European Social Survey (ESS) and the survey on the
quality of government in the European regions (EQI) from the Quality of Government institute.
This focused analysis on Europe allows us to investigate the variation in trust and institutional
quality in a relatively homogenous group of countries, and serves as a robustness checks for the
relationship found using global data.
In our global analysis, we measure the level of social trust using a weighted country-averaged
response to the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or
that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” from the World Value Survey (Inglehart
et al., 2014) and European Value Survey (EVS, 2011), merged version, available in the Quality
of Government dataset (Teorell et al., 2020).
In operationalizing institutional quality, we use indicators capturing how widespread embezzle-
ment (theft of public funds for private use) is in the countries under analysis available from the
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute (Coppedge et al., 2020a). The measures are expert
answers to the questions: “How often do public sector employees steal, embezzle, or misappro-
priate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?” and ”How often do
members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or
their agents, steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal
or family use?” (Coppedge et al., 2020b; Pemstein et al., 2020). We reverse the indicators, so
that higher values mean larger extent of embezzlement.
We control for natural logarithm (ln) of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, the level
of inequality measured by GINI index (World Bank, 2016) and homicide rates (World Health
Organization, 2019), available in the Quality of Government dataset (Teorell et al., 2020). Fur-
ther, we control for the level of ethnic fragmentation (Ln ethn. gr.), measured by the number of
politically relevant groups in a country (Vogt et al., 2015) and the level of democracy measured
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by the Electoral Democracy Index (Elect. dem.) from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al.,
2020a).
We perform a conservative cross-sectional analysis using data from the latest year in which the
measure of trust is available:
y = β0 + β1embezz + β2X + ε (1)
where y is the dependent variable measuring country-averaged social trust, embezz is our mea-
sure of public sector or executive embezzlement depending on the specification, and X is a vector
containing the covariates listed above. When estimating equation (1), we use the average of the
trust measure per country, such that countries are our unit of observation.
TABLE 1. OLS REGRESSIONS OF AVERAGE SOCIAL TRUST AND ADMINISTRATIVE AND
EXECUTIVE EMBEZZLEMENT ACROSS COUNTRIES.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Social trust
Adm. embez. -0.051*** -0.045*** -0.091***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.024)
Exec. embez. -0.055*** -0.033* -0.095**
(0.015) (0.019) (0.039)
Ln GDP p.c. 0.033*** 0.032 0.048*** 0.054**
(0.013) (0.028) (0.012) (0.027)
Ln ethn. gr. 0.012 0.024 0.007 -0.008
(0.024) (0.033) (0.024) (0.032)
Homicide rate -0.003*** 0.002 -0.004*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Elect. dem. -0.155* -0.521*** -0.117 -0.560***
(0.085) (0.181) (0.091) (0.196)
GINI (WB est.) -0.012*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.478*** 0.252 1.087*** 0.399*** 0.003 0.779**
(0.047) (0.158) (0.347) (0.044) (0.124) (0.367)
Observations 103 97 57 103 97 57
R-squared 0.229 0.340 0.522 0.132 0.305 0.477
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions control for log
GDP per capita, log number of politically active ethnic groups, the homicide rate, the score on the electoral
democracy index, and the GINI index (World Bank estimate).
Table 1 presents the results of equation 1, analyzing the relationship between average social
trust and level of embezzlement across countries. Models 1 through 3 investigate the relationship
between the average levels of social trust per country and the level of embezzlement in the public
sector. The relationship is negative and significant, implying that countries with higher extent
of embezzlement practices in the public sector on average tend to have lower levels of social
trust. Models 4 to 6 present the results for the same analysis with the executive embezzlement
levels used as an independent variable instead. The relationship is also negative and significant.
We summarise these findings in Result 1.
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Result 1. Social trust is positively associated with the level of administrative and executive
embezzlement across countries.
In the next step we perform the analysis for European NUTS2 regions. We measure social trust
using a question “On a 1-10 scale, with ‘1’ being ‘don’t trust at all’, and ‘10’ being ‘complete
trust’, how much do you personally trust other people in your region?” from the 2017 European
Quality of Government Index survey (Charron et al., 2019). In order to measure institutional
quality, we use a comprehensive European Quality of Government Index (EQI) calculated for
the European NUTS2 regions by Charron et al. (2019). We control for individual-level factors
that can influence how an individual responds to the trust-question, such as age, gender, net
household income, education level, perceived state of the economy, and indices of perceived
and experienced corruption. 5. We also control for region-level factors that can influence social
trust, such as the level of crime, measured with the number of reported burglaries, homicides and
robberies, total population size, per capita GDP, share of the population at risk of poverty, adult
unemployment rate, and net migration rate, originating from the Eurostat Regional Database
(European Commission, 2020) and available through the EU Regional Dataset (Charron et al.,
2020). We use the region-level variables for the latest year available before 2017.
We perform a multilevel mixed-effects linear regression model with random intercepts across
regions r and countries k :
y = β0,r,k + β1EQI + β2X + β3R+ ε (2)
where X and R are controls at individual and regional levels respectively. Standard errors are
clustered at country level. Corresponding models, in which the slope of the regional EQI score
is also allowed to vary across regions and countries, yield the same results.
The results from the estimation of model (2) are reported in Table 2. The positive correlation
between social trust and the EQI score in the respondent’s region is evident: the coefficient
is positive, large and well within 1% significance level in all specifications. This implies that
individuals living in regions with higher institutional quality tend to trust others more, which
is in line with the findings behind Result 1.
5Details about the construction of our indices of perceived and experienced corruption can be found in Appendix C.
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TABLE 2. MULTILEVEL MIXED-EFFECTS LINEAR REGRESSION WITH RANDOM INTERCEPTS AT
REGION AND COUNTRY LEVEL OF STATED LEVEL OF SOCIAL TRUST ON THE EUROPEAN
QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT INDEX.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Social trust level
EQI Score 0.493*** 0.341*** 0.273*** 0.313***
(0.096) (0.088) (0.055) (0.052)
Perceived state of econ. -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.011**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Perceived corruption -0.454*** -0.438*** -0.441***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.046)
Experienced corruption -0.143*** -0.132*** -0.086***
(0.020) (0.029) (0.028)
Nr. burglaries (x1000) -0.011* -0.006
(0.006) (0.010)
GDP p.c. (x10000) 0.091** 0.102**
(0.037) (0.045)
Share pop. at poverty risk -0.008
(0.007)
Constant 6.181*** 6.328*** 5.982*** 6.207***
(0.150) (0.138) (0.185) (0.215)
Individual controls
Additional regional controls
Observations 59,042 56,045 39,355 26,075
Number of groups
Region 150 150 100 64
Country 16 16 13 10
Robust standard errors, clustered at country level, in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Individual controls include perceived state of the economy, and (omitted from the table) gender,
age, education level and net household income. Regional controls include indices of perceived and
experienced corruption, number of reported burglaries, per capita GDP, the share of the population
at risk of poverty and (omitted from the table) adult unemployment rate, the number of reported
homicides and robberies, net migration rate, and population size.
CAUSAL EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL
QUALITY ON SOCIAL TRUST
In this section we present our experimental investigation exploring the causal link between
administrative embezzlement and social trust.
Experimental design and procedures
The experiments proceeded in two phases. In the first phase, we randomly exposed individuals
to setups with different institutional quality in the context of a public good game. In the second
phase, we elicited behavioural measures of individuals’ social trust. The participants received
the payoff for only one randomly selected phase, after the end of the experiment, and were
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informed about this at the beginning of the session.
Public good stage The purpose of the first phase was to expose the subjects to exoge-
nously determined levels of institutional quality, thus breaking the endogeneities that hinder
the observation of the causal link between the institutional quality and social trust when using
cross-national survey data. We implemented the first phase as a public good game. We deliber-
ately chose to operationalise the institutional framework as a public good game because it allows
us to expose the subjects to an environment mimicking that under which the embezzlement of
public resources occurs.





as the sum of all players’ contributions c in the public good game. We modified the standard
public good game to introduce an intermediate agent (a public official), and an institutional
framework in which we experimentally manipulate the institutions’ ability to prevent corrupt
behaviour on behalf of the intermediate agent. We describe how we manipulate the institutional
framework and our experimental conditions in the next section.
The intermediate agent, denoted k and henceforth referred to as to the Collector, was one of
the three members of the group playing the public good game. The Collector was mandated to
collect each of the group members’ contributions to the public good and to redistribute them to
the group - a task, which is normally automated in experimental implementations of the public
good game. Crucially, we allow for the possibility for the collector to embezzle any fraction of the
collected amount. We denote the amount redistributed by the Collector as R, with 0 ≤ R ≤ Y .
If R = Y , the entire amount of contributions collected by the group is redistributed, exactly as
it would be if the whole procedure were automated. On the other hand, if R=0, the Collector
keeps the whole amount for herself and redistributes nothing. The payoffs of player i 6= k are
then given by
πi = E − ci + αR, (3)
where α = 0.5 is the marginal per-capita return of the public good game, E denotes players’
endowment and 0 ≤ ci ≤ E is player i ’s contribution to the public good. As 1/n < α < 1, the
game induces a conflict between individual self-interest (the full free riding Nash equilibrium)
and social welfare (full contributions). We will refer to the players who are not Collectors as
group members. Similarly the Collector’s payoffs are given by:
πk = E − ck + αR+ Y −R. (4)
Clearly, the Collector maximises her own payoff by setting R = 0, that is by redistributing
nothing of what was collected by the group and keeping instead everything for herself. Notice
that this way the Nash equilibrium of zero contributions of the standard public good game
is preserved. Importantly, in practical terms, the public good game was played only once so
as to eliminate any incentive for the Collector to build a reputation by contributing a large
amount to signal, for instance, honesty. Moreover, we gave the players no feedback on the
individual contributions or on the Collector’s choice of how much to redistribute at the end
of the public good stage. We instead collected the group members’ beliefs about each other’s
contributions. Additionally, we told the group members that the group had collected a total
amount of contributions equal to Y , and we asked them to guess how much of that amount
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would be redistributed by the Collector. In other words, we elicited the group members’ beliefs
about R. We incentivise the beliefs against the actually recorded values.
Trust stage In the second phase, we elicited our target variable: A behavioural measure of
social trust among the agents. We implemented this phase as a standard trust game (Berg
et al., 1995). We matched the subjects in pairs consisting of a sender and a receiver, and each
received an endowment of six euros. The senders chose to send any integer amount of their
endowment to the receivers, who would receive the amount doubled by the experimenter. What
they had not sent, the senders could keep for themselves. The receivers could then choose to
send any integer amount of their endowment plus what they had received back to the senders.
As receivers maximise their payoff by sending back nothing, it is a dominant strategy for the
senders to keep everything for themselves.
As we are interested in the impact of the quality of the institutional environment on people’s
willingness to trust others, we are particularly interested in the trusting behaviour of the group
members (not collectors). For this reason, group members only played the trust game with
other group members (not collectors), and were made aware of this. Moreover, and importantly,
we made the subjects aware that the public good phase groups were broken up after the end
of that phase, and that for the trust game they would be randomly re-matched with other
members of the session. We can thus rule out any impact of reciprocal behaviours across phases
on the choices in the trust game. For instance, if the person they were playing the trust game
was among the same people they played the public good game phase with, a higher trusting
behaviour could be driven by knowledge of a greater amount of total contributions to the public
good (remember that during the belief elicitation phase group members were made aware of
the total amount of contributions collected). A greater amount of contributions would in fact
signal a greater willingness to cooperate and perhaps more trustworthiness. By breaking up the
public good group and organising subjects in new pairs, we decouple what actually happened
in the public good phase from the trust game and are able to isolate the impact of exposure to
a weaker institutional environment on generalised social trust.
All subjects played both the roles of sender and receiver in random order. That is, after the
trust game pairs were randomly formed, one of the players was assigned the role of sender and
the other the role of receiver. They then played the trust game as described above. After both
senders and receivers made their choices, the pair was commonly known to be broken up and
the players reassigned to a new pair. The trust game was then played a second time in the new
pair. However, the senders were now assigned the role of receivers and vice versa.6 Moreover,
we kept feedback at the minimum, only communicating to the receivers the amount available to
be transferred back to the sender. Additionally, the instructions informed the players that only
one of the two rounds, randomly selected, was valid for payment.
After the trust game was completed, the subjects answered a number of socio-demographic
questions eliciting their age, gender, profession and field of study, if a student. Finally, we
debriefed the subjects by communicating them their payoffs in the public good and in the trust
game stages, including which one of the two would be paid out.
The experiments took place at the ECONLAB laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Tax
Law and Public Finance in Munich, Germany. We collected data from 264 subjects in 11
sessions at the end of February 2020. The average payout was 22 Euros and completion time
was approximately 45 minutes.
6As in the first pair assignment, public good group members were again matched with other public good group members and
Collectors with other Collectors.
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Experimental conditions
In order to introduce exogenous variation in institutional quality in our experimental setup,
we introduced an institution which we experimentally make more or less capable of preventing
embezzlement on behalf of the collector. To do so, the software randomly drew a number
d ∼ U(0, 99) where U denotes a uniform distribution of integers between 0 and 99. A check on
the amount entered by the Collector would be performed if d ≥ t where t ∈ {0, 1, 50} according to
the experimental condition (varied between sessions). In case a check occurred and the amount
entered for redistribution was found to be incorrect, an error message notified the Collector
that the amount entered should be revised for the game to continue. We nevertheless stored
information about the incorrect amount entered to measure the embezzlement attempt. Notice
that the wording used in delivering our experimental conditions to the participants eliminates
the risk that the different conditions might differently focalise their attention on antisociality
and unethical behaviour.
Condition Zero In condition Zero (96 subjects), we implemented an institutional environ-
ment fully capable of preventing corrupt behavior on behalf of public officials: A 0% chance
that any attempt of stealing the group’s contributions might succeed. Here, any attempt at
embezzlement on behalf of the Collector was met with an error message.7
Condition One In condition One (96 subjects) the institutional environment allows for a
small chance, 1%, that an embezzlement attempt might succeed. The instructions communicated
to the subjects that the amount entered for redistribution by the Collector would be checked
with 99% probability.
Condition Fifty In condition Fifty (72 subjects) the institutional environment allowed for a
50% chance that an embezzlement attempt might succeed. The instructions communicated to
the subjects that the amount entered for redistribution by the Collector would be checked with
50% probability.8
Experimental results
Table 3 displays the results from an OLS regression of the amounts sent in the trust phase of
the experiment, restricted to group members only, on the institutional conditions. All subjects
participated both as senders and as receivers in random order, such that we have a sending
choice for each subject. All regressions control for the order in which the subject participated in
the trust game, the subject’s gender, age and profession.9 Moreover, we control for normalised
beliefs about the Collector’s honesty in the public good phase, that is the amount believed to
be redistributed divided by the total amount of contributions collected by the group (Belief(e)),
of beliefs about the other group member’s contribution (Belief(c)), of own contribution and of
total group contributions.10
7See the instructions in Appendix F.
8The minimal detectable effect over standardised social trust measures (Collectors excluded) across conditions Zero and One
is MDE=0.47, and MDE=0.52 in comparison of Condition Fifty with Condition Zero or One at α = 0.05 and power p = 0.8.
9A Kruskall-Wallis test cannot reject the null of equality in the amounts sent between subjects who participated as senders
first and receivers later or vice versa; p-value=0.622.
10Corresponding Tobit regressions reported in Appendix B confirm the results in Table 3.
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TABLE 3. OLS REGRESSION OF AMOUNTS SENT IN THE TRUST PHASE OF THE EXPERIMENT.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Trust game: amount sent
Condition Zero
Condition One -0.724* -0.778* -0.766* -0.794*
(0.413) (0.412) (0.413) (0.405)
Condition Fifty -1.177*** -1.198*** -1.159*** -1.029**
(0.433) (0.430) (0.432) (0.442)
Own contribution 0.117*** 0.086*** 0.095** 0.090**
(0.027) (0.033) (0.037) (0.037)






Sender first -0.245 -0.279 -0.255 -0.203
(0.342) (0.342) (0.342) (0.337)
Constant 3.241*** 2.660*** 2.599*** 1.718**
(0.613) (0.742) (0.734) (0.814)
Individual controls
Observations 174 174 174 174
R-squared 0.151 0.166 0.169 0.187
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regressions control for
the order in which the subject participated in the trust game as sender and receiver (Sender first),
age, gender and profession. The variable Belief(e) measures normalised beliefs about the amount
entered for redistribution by the collector divided by the group’s total contributions, while Belief(c)
measures beliefs about the other group members’ contributions.
Table 3 shows that the amounts sent in the trust game are highly sensitive to the treatment.
Even a small 1% chance that an embezzlement attempt might succeed reduces social trust.
Moving from 0% probability to 1% probability of successful embezzlement attempts yields a
decrease in trust, expressed in the decrease of the amounts sent just below 80 cents, significant
at 10% level. When moving from 1% to 50% probability of successful embezzlement attempts,
the amount sent decreases on average by 1 Euro, indicating an even larger decrease in the trust
levels, significant at 5% level. The effect size is approximately 30% larger than that observed
for Condition One, though not significantly different.
We summarise these findings in Result 2:
Result 2. Amounts sent in the trust game phase drop significantly when embezzlement attempts
have even a small chance of succeeding.
Result 2 support the hypothesis that trust among strangers is causally eroded by exposure an
institutional environment incapable of perfectly harnessing corrupt behaviour on behalf of public
officials.
One might ask whether the decrease in willingness to trust others that we observe among those
who were exposed to imperfect institutions is driven by the lower earnings the subjects expect to
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obtain from the public good game: Successful embezzlement of a positive amount translates into
reduced earnings on behalf of the group members. We now show that this mechanism cannot
have produced the findings in Result 2.11 In order to be able to measure beliefs about the
amount the Collectors’ would attempt to embezzle, we revealed the total amount of contributions
collected by the whole group to the subjects (after they had chosen their contribution to the
public good). For this reason, we are able to verify, first of all, whether there are reasons
to believe the information provided to the subjects about their group’s cooperativeness might
explain our results. Second, we are able to check whether the beliefs we elicited about the
Collectors’ honesty can fully account for the variation in trust observed across our experimental
conditions. Tables 4 report average total group contributions.
TABLE 4. TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS COLLECTED ON AVERAGE IN EACH CONDITION.
Condition Total group Standard Deviation KW p-value
contributions
Zero 19.25 8.16
One 20.78 11.19 0.714
Fifty 19.58 9.15
Collectors excluded
Condition Group member Standard Deviation KW p-value
contributions
Zero 12.97 7.54
One 13.66 9.66 0.733
Fifty 11.67 8.34
The last column displays the p-value from a Kruskall-Wallis (KW) test of equality across populations
in the three conditions.
Kruskal-Wallis (KW) tests do not allow us to reject the null hypothesis that total group contri-
butions are equal across conditions, regardless of whether the Collectors are excluded. The same
result emerges from the OLS regressions of contributions restricted to group members reported
in Table D.1 in Appendix D. These findings reassure us that the group’s cooperativeness inferred
by group members on the basis of the total contributions collected in the three conditions cannot
be the cause of the patterns observed in trusting behaviours.
We now check whether trust patterns can be fully explained by beliefs about the Collectors’
honesty. The regressions in Table 1 control for the proportion of group contributions believed to
be redistributed by the Collectors and for beliefs about other group members’ contributions.12
Despite beliefs about embezzlement attempts having a sizeable impact on trusting behaviour,
neither these nor beliefs about others’ contributions exhaustively explain the variation in trust
across experimental conditions. The impact of quality of the institutional environment remains
stable, strong and significant. Beyond any concern about efficiency or expected earnings, there-
11Recall from Section ”Experimental conditions” that the wording used in designing our conditions excludes the possibility of
differences in the focality of unethical behaviour across conditions.
12Caution is due when interpreting these coefficients: Beliefs about others’ contributions and about the amount embezzled by
the Collector might very well be endogenous to the experimental conditions. As Tables E.1 and E.2 in Appendix E demonstrate,
this suspicion turns out to be well founded, at least for what concerns beliefs about embezzled amounts: The amounts which
Collectors are believed to try to embezzle increase when the institutions are less capable of preventing success. On the contrary,
beliefs about others’ contributions do not vary with the experimental conditions.
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fore, these findings indicate that the quality of the institutional environment that individuals
were exposed to, in terms of its ability to harness unethical behaviours on behalf of the admin-
istrators of group resources, is directly capable of decreasing trust among individuals.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The aim of this paper has been to test a widespread hypothesis in the social scientific literature,
postulating that institutional quality affects social trust. We first established the presence of a
positive association between institutional quality and social trust on the macro level by analyzing
the relationship patterns on a sample of 97 world countries. We then explored the causality
in the relationship between institutional quality and social trust by conducting a laboratory
experiment.
The results from our correlational analysis show that countries and EU NUTS regions with
higher institutional quality on average tend to have higher levels of social trust. These patterns
are in accordance with those observed in the previous research, at least in countries characterised
by a relatively moderate to high levels of institutional quality. Our analysis uncovers in fact a
negative relationship between the level of embezzlement and social trust.
With our experimental investigation we establish the presence of causality in the observed re-
lationship, going from the quality of the institutional environment to social trust. We would
like to emphasize, however, that in this investigation we do not falsify the claim that causality
running in the opposite direction, from social trust towards institutional quality, exists. It might
still be the case that more trusting societies are causally capable of putting stronger institutions
in place, such that institutions and social trust reinforce each other. Uncovering whether the
relationship is in fact a virtuous circle is outside of the scope of this paper. Instead, we find
a strong evidence that exogenous exposure to stronger or weaker institutional environments,
measured as their ability to constrain public administrators’ behaviours, impacts individuals’
willingness to trust others. In particular, we find that social trust is maximal when the insti-
tutional environment can perfectly prevent corrupt behaviour on behalf of the public officials.
Trust levels are instead significantly lower once perfect control of the public official’s behaviour
cannot be guaranteed. Noticeably, our analyses suggest that trust may drop discontinuously
once institutional quality deviates from perfection even slightly. Willingness to trust others in
fact drops sharply once we introduce even an extremely small and nearly irrelevant 1% chance
that corrupt administrators might successfully embezzle public money.
This study should be considered as a step forward in resolving the uncertainty surrounding
the causal ties between the institutional environment, social trust and, more generally, the
social environment. Future research should focus on determining the exact mechanisms behind
the causal relationship presented here. For instance, having observed the causal impact of
institutional quality on trusting behaviours, the natural way forward is to investigate its effect
on perceptions and beliefs about society as a whole. For instance, one relevant question to ask
is whether the perception that the administrators engage in less corruption stems from the fact
that good-quality institutions render such behaviours (nearly) pointless from a mere moral cost
to benefit analysis, or because administrators are more ethical per se. Another relevant question
for future research is whether the information on what the society considers the “right thing to
do” mediates the relationship we observe in this study. Finally, despite our design controls for it,
institutions of varying quality in the real world might differ in their power to focus individuals’
attention on the possibility of unethical behaviours on behalf of the administrators, and, in turn,
other group members. We hope this article will constitute the starting point for investigations
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of all of these and other mechanisms.
In conclusion, this article lends credibility to the arguments assigning the institutional environ-
ment a leading role in laying the pre-conditions for the development of a sound and trusting
social environment. These findings are consequential. A trusting social fabric is better equipped
to provide public goods and coordinated collective actions that benefit the community as a
whole than individual self-interest. The examples of such collective actions and public goods
are plenty: managing common pool resources, establishing incomplete or hardly enforceable
contracts and agreements, containing the adverse consequences of natural disasters, such as
pandemics, among others. Crucially, the institutional framework, as opposed to social trust
itself, can be manipulated and its quality can be, at least to some extent, improved by design.
We provide first experimental evidence that social planners aiming at fostering social trust can,
by virtue of the causal relationship uncovered here, count on institutional design among the
tools at their disposal to achieve socially desirable objectives.
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Mechkova, V., Medzihorsky, J., von Römer, J., Sundström, A., Tzelgov, E., Wang, Y.-t., Wig,
T., and Ziblatt, D. (2020a). V-Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset v10”. Varieties
of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Bernhard,
M., Fish, M. S., Glynn, A., Hicken, A., Lührmann, A., Marquardt, K. L., McMann, K.,
Paxton, P., Pemstein, D., Seim, B., Sigman, R., Skaaning, S.-E., Staton, J., Cornell, A.,
Gastaldi, L., Gjerløw, H., Mechkova, V., von Römer, J., Sundtröm, A., Tzelgov, E., Uberti,
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Freitag, M. and Bühlmann, M. (2009). Crafting trust: The role of political institutions in a
comparative perspective. Comparative Political Studies, 42(12):1537–1566.
Graeff, P. and Svendsen, G. T. (2013). Trust and corruption: The influence of positive and neg-
ative social capital on the economic development in the european union. Quality & Quantity,
47(5):2829–2846.
Inglehart, R., Haerpfer, C., Moreno, A., Welzel, C., Kizilova, K., Diez-Medrano, J., Lagos, M.,
Norris, P., Ponarin, E., Puranen, B., and et al. (2014). World Values Survey: All Rounds -
Country-Pooled Datafile 1981-2014. JD Systems Institute, Madrid.
Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic payoff? a cross-country
investigation. The Quarterly journal of economics, 112(4):1251–1288.
Knack, S. and Zak, P. J. (2003). Building trust: public policy, interpersonal trust, and economic
development. Supreme court economic review, 10:91–107.
Kumlin, S. and Rothstein, B. (2005). Making and breaking social capital: The impact of welfare-
state institutions. Comparative Political Studies, 38(4):339–365.
Lambsdorff, J. G. (2002). How confidence facilitates illegal transactions: An empirical approach.
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, pages 829–853.
Levi, M. (1998). A state of trust. In Braithwaite, V. and Levi, M., editors, Trust and governance.
Russell Sage Foundation, New York.
Martinangeli, A. F. M. and Martinsson, P. (2020). We, the rich: Inequality, identity and
cooperation. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 178:249–266.
Nannestad, P., Svendsen, G. T., Dinesen, P. T., and Sønderskov, K. M. (2014). Do institutions
or culture determine the level of social trust? the natural experiment of migration from
non-western to western countries. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 40(4):544–565.
15
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge; New York.
Ortiz-Ospina, E. and Roser, M. (2020). Trust. our world in data. URL:
https://ourworldindata.org/trust (Date of access: 23.09.2020).
Ostrom, E. (2005). Understanding institutional diversity. Prinston University Press, Prinston,
New Jersey.
Pemstein, D., Marquardt, K. L., Tzelgov, E., Wang, Y.-t., Medzihorsky, J., Krusell, J., Miri,
F., and von Römer, J. (2020). The V-Dem Measurement Model: La- tent Variable Analysis
for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data.
Rothstein, B. (2000). Trust, social dilemmas and collective memories. Journal of Theoretical
Politics, 12(4):477–501.
Rothstein, B. (2011). The quality of government: Corruption, social trust, and inequality in
international perspective. University of Chicago Press.
Rothstein, B. (2013). Corruption and social trust: Why the fish rots from the head down. Social
Research, 80(4):1009–1032.
Rothstein, B. and Eek, D. (2009). Political corruption and social trust: An experimental ap-
proach. Rationality and society, 21(1):81–112.
Rothstein, B. and Stolle, D. (2008). The state and social capital: An institutional theory of
generalized trust. Comparative politics, 40(4):441–459.
Rothstein, B. and Uslaner, E. M. (2005). All for all: Equality, corruption, and social trust.
World Politics, 58:41.
Sønderskov, K. M. and Dinesen, P. T. (2014). Danish exceptionalism: Explaining the unique
increase in social trust over the past 30 years. European Sociological Review, 30(6):782–795.
Spadaro, G., Gangl, K., Van Prooijen, J.-W., Van Lange, P. A., and Mosso, C. O. (2020).
Enhancing feelings of security: How institutional trust promotes interpersonal trust. PloS
one, 15(9).
Tarrow, S. (1996). Making social science work across space and time: a critical reflection on
robert putnam’s making democracy work. American political science review, 90(2):389–397.
Teorell, J., Dahlberg, S., Holmberg, S., Rothstein, B., Alvarado Pachon, N., and Axelsson, S.
(2020). The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan20. Quality of Government
Institute, University of Gothenburg.
Uslaner, E. M. (2002). The moral foundations of trust. Cambridge University Press.
Uslaner, E. M. (2008). Where you stand depends upon where your grandparents sat: The
inheritability of generalized trust. Public opinion quarterly, 72(4):725–740.
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APPENDICES
A MEASURE OF SOCIAL TRUST FROM THE EUROPEAN
SOCIAL SURVEY
We check for the robustness of our results in Table 2 by using a measure of social trust from the
latest round (Round 9) of the European Social Survey (ESS) 2018. This way, despite an extreme
reduction in our sample size, we ensure that our variable of interest and our main determinant
come from two different data sources. We correlate the social trust measure from the ESS with
the EQI score from the European Quality of Government Index Survey (Charron et al., 2019)
and control for the same regional indicators used in the main analysis. Moreover, we control for
similar individual-level controls, only taken from the ESS dataset. We again estimate multilevel
mixed-effects linear regression models to allow the intercept of our models to vary between
countries and regions, and cluster standard errors at the country level. The results reported in
Table A.1 confirm the findings from Table 2 and are summarised in Result 1. The correlation
between stated levels of social trust and the European Quality of Government Index is positive,
strong and significant. As earlier, we control for a number of individual (age, gender, net income,
education, perceived state of the economy and overall feeling of safety) and regional (number
of reported burglaries, homicides and robberies, per capita GDP, adult unemployment rate, net
immigration rate and population size) characteristics.13 We do not control for the share of the
population at risk of poverty because of lack of data.
13Individual feeling of safety replaces stated perception and experience of corruption, which are not elicited in the European
Social Survey.
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TABLE A.1. MULTILEVEL MIXED-EFFECTS LINEAR REGRESSION OF SOCIAL TRUST LEVELS
(FROM EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY) ON THE EUROPEAN QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT INDEX.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Social trust
EQI Score 0.724*** 0.605*** 0.977***
(0.120) (0.119) (0.286)
Perceived state of econ. 0.234*** 0.238***
(0.018) (0.022)
Safety feeling 0.434*** 0.423***
(0.089) (0.103)
Nr. burglaries (x1000) -0.082**
(0.034)
GDP p.c. (x10000) 0.144
(0.169)




Observations 6,638 6,474 3,668
Number of groups
Region 79 79 50
Country 6 6 5
Robust standard errors, clustered at country level, in parentheses, *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Individual controls omitted from the table include gender, age,
education level, and net household income. Regional controls omitted from the table
include adult unemployment rate, the number of reported homicides and robberies,
net migration rate, and population size.
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B TOBIT REGRESSIONS
Table B.1 reports the results from Tobit regressions corresponding to the OLS regressions re-
ported in Table 3, confirming the results there reported.
TABLE B.1. TOBIT REGRESSIONS OF AMOUNT SENT IN THE TRUST PHASE OF THE
EXPERIMENT.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Trust game: amount sent
Condition One -1.498* -1.609* -1.581* -1.627*
(0.903) (0.899) (0.898) (0.889)
Condition Fifty -2.285** -2.292** -2.225** -1.914**
(0.966) (0.956) (0.961) (0.958)
Own contribution 0.266*** 0.206** 0.221*** 0.213**
(0.070) (0.079) (0.084) (0.083)






Sender first -0.356 -0.410 -0.373 -0.294
(0.765) (0.758) (0.760) (0.752)
Constant 3.164** 2.044 1.944 -0.113
(1.469) (1.642) (1.648) (1.928)
Observations 174 174 174 174
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.The regressions con-
trol for the order in which the subject participated in the trust game as sender and
receiver, age, gender and profession. Belief(e) denotes normalised beliefs about the
amount entered for redistribution by the collector divided by the group’s total con-
tributions, Belief(c) denotes beliefs about the other group members’ contributions.
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C SUMMARY INDICES OF PERCEPTION AND EXPERI-
ENCE OF CORRUPTION
We construct our index of individual perception of corruption by performing a factor analysis on
all available questions measuring perceptions of corrupt behaviour on behalf of public officials
available in the European Quality of Government Index survey (Charron et al., 2019). We
then retain individual predicted scores on the first component from the rotated varimax as
a summary index of perceived corruption. As a result, the index consists of the following
variables, all measured on a scale of agreement ranging from 1 (strong disagreement) to 10
(strong agreement):
1. Corruption is prevalent in my area’s local public school system.
2. Corruption is prevalent in the public healthcare system in my area.
3. Corruption is prevalent in the police force in my area.
4. People in my area must use some form of corruption to just to get some basic public
services.
5. Corruption in my area is used to get access to special unfair privileges and wealth.
6. Corruption is NOT present in elections in my area.
Table C.1 presents the details from the factor analysis. Figure C.1 illustrates the country-
averaged scores of perceived corruption, re-centred around 1 (rather than zero) to ease visual-
ization.
TABLE C.1. VARIMAX ROTATED FACTOR ANALYSIS OF THE VARIABLES MEASURING
PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPT BEHAVIOUR AVAILABLE IN THE EUROPEAN QUALITY OF
GOVERNMENT INDEX SURVEY.
Factor analysis First component
Factor Eigenvalue Expl. variance (%) Variable Factor loading
Factor 1 (retained) 3.22093 0.5368 1 0.7969
Factor 2 0.95144 0.1586 2 0.8340
Factor 3 0.79538 0.1326 3 0.8194
Factor 4 0.38086 0.0635 4 0.7656
Factor 5 0.33888 0.0565 5 0.7498
Factor 6 0.31251 0.0521 6 -0.2654
Individual scores on the first component, explaining the largest proportion of variance in the un-
derlying variables, are used as a summary index of perceived corruption. These scores are by
construction normally distributed around zero. The table also reports the factor loadings of the
single variables on the first retained component extracted from the factor analysis. The coding of
variable number 6 is inverted relative to the other five, resulting in a negative loading.
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FIGURE C.1. DISTRIBUTION OF PERCEIVED CORRUPTION SCORES ACROSS OUR
ESTIMATION SAMPLE (RE-CENTRED AROUND 1 INSTEAD OF 0 TO EASE VISUALIZATION).
We construct the index of experienced corruption as the number of positive answers given by the
respondent to all the questions asking whether (s)he has ever witnessed corrupt behaviour on
behalf of public officials available in the European Quality of Government Index survey.
The questions are as follows:
In the last 12 months, have you or anyone in your family been asked by a public official to give
an informal gift or bribe in:
1. Education services?
2. Health or medical services?
3. Police?
4. Any other government-run agency?
In the last 12 months, have you or anyone in your family given an informal gift or bribe in:
1. Education services?
2. Health or medical services?
3. Police?
4. Any other government-run agency?
Figure C.2 presents the distribution of our index of experienced corruption across our estimation
sample.
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FIGURE C.2. DISTRIBUTION OF PERCEIVED CORRUPTION SCORES ACROSS OUR
ESTIMATION SAMPLE.
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D PUBLIC GOOD CONTRIBUTIONS
Table D.1 displays OLS regressions of the amounts contributed to the public good by the group
members (Collectors excluded) in the public good game phase of our experiment. As evident,
contributions are not impacted by our experimental conditions.
TABLE D.1. OLS REGRESSION OF THE AMOUNTS CONTRIBUTED BY THE GROUP MEMBERS IN
THE PUBLIC GOOD GAME.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Public good contributions
Condition Zero
Condition One 0.240 0.221 0.213
(1.072) (1.073) (1.072)






Constant 3.300** 2.654 2.291
(1.669) (1.923) (2.065)
Individual controls
Observations 174 174 174
R-squared 0.083 0.084 0.086
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The regressions control for age, gender and profession. Belief(e) =
normalised beliefs about the amount entered for redistribution by the
collector divided by the group’s total contributions, Belief(c) = beliefs
about the other group members’ contributions. The regressions restrict
the estimation sample to group members (non-collectors) only.
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E ANALYSIS OF BELIEFS
E.1 Beliefs about embezzlement
We now show that our conditions indeed conveyed the feeling that the institutional environment
would be differently capable of preventing corrupt behaviour on behalf of the official. We measure
these perceptions with the subjects’ beliefs about the amount of contributions collected by the
group the Collectors would redistribute to the group. Recall that any amount not redistributed
would remain in the Collector’s pockets.
Table E.1 presents regressions of the group members’ beliefs about the proportion of the to-
tal amount of contributions collected by the group which will be redistributed by the Collec-
tor.
TABLE E.1. OLS REGRESSION OF NORMALISED BELIEFS ABOUT THE AMOUNT
REDISTRIBUTED BY THE COLLECTORS.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Beliefs about embezzlement
Amount entered for redistribution
Condition Zero
Condition One 0.019 0.021 0.022
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Condition Fifty -0.106** -0.107** -0.103*
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053)




Constant 0.655*** 0.676*** 0.687***
(0.069) (0.084) (0.084)
Observations 174 174 174
R-squared 0.094 0.095 0.101
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The proportion of the total amount contributed expected to be redistributed drops significantly
in condition Fifty compared to when embezzlement on behalf of the collector is prevented with
certainty. On the other hand, beliefs in Condition One are not statistically different from the
baseline. These results point towards a significant increase in the amount that the Collector is
expected to attempt to embezzle of group’s money when the institutions are not fully capable
of preventing successful attempts.
E.2 Beliefs about others’ contributions
Table E.2 reports the analysis of beliefs about the other group members’ contributions to the
public good game, on which we detect no impact of the experimental conditions.
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TABLE E.2. OLS REGRESSION OF BELIEFS ABOUT OTHERS’ CONTRIBUTIONS.
Model 1 Model 2
Beliefs about others’ contributions
Condition Zero Condition One 0.165 -0.285
(0.861) (0.694)








Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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F EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
This experiment consists of two parts, Part I and Part II.
At the end of the experiment, only one of the two parts will be randomly selected by the software
and will be valid for payment.
Your earnings and your actions in Part I will not affect your earnings or actions in Part II.
Similarly, your earnings or actions in Part II will have no consequence on your earnings or actions
in Part I.
In the following pages you will find instructions for Part I. The instructions for Part II will be
distributed at the end of Part I.
Part I
You will be randomly assigned to a group of three people.
You and the other people in your group will receive an endowment of 20 Euros each.
Moreover, your group has a project. Your task is to decide how many Euros of your endowment
you want to contribute to the project and how many you want to keep for yourself to place in
your Purse. At the end, the amount of Euros in your Purse depend on how many Euros you keep
for yourself, how many you contribute to the project, and on how many Euros are contributed
by the others in your group.
The amount of Euros you will have in your Purse at the end of the session will be
paid out to you in cash.
The software will randomly choose one person from your group to be the Collector. We will
refer to the other people in the group as to the Group Members. The Collector’s task is
that of collecting the contributions of all Group Members to the group project, including him
or herself, and transferring them to the distribution software.
Once everyone in the group has made their contribution to the group project, the total amount
of Euros contributed by the whole group is transferred into the Purse of the Collector. The Col-
lector will then manually enter the amount of Euros collected by the group to the distribution
software. The amount they entered will then be re-transferred from their Purse to the distribu-
tion software and every person in the group will receive their earnings from the project.
Your earnings are computed as follows.
Your Purse, and that of the other members of your group, will consist of two parts:
(1) The Euros which you have not contributed and kept for yourself are placed in your Purse,
The amount of Euros you can allocate between your private Purse and the project is equal to
your endowment. You choose how much to contribute to the project by entering a number
between 0 and the amount of Euros in your endowment. As soon as you have defined your
contribution you will also have defined the amount of Euros you will keep for yourself. The
points you keep for yourself will be automatically placed in your Purse:
Euros kept in your Purse = your Endowment – the Euros you contribute to the
project
The second part of your Purse are:
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(2) The “earnings from the project”, for which:
Earnings from the project = 0.5 x amount re-transferred to the distribution software
by the Collector.
The earnings from the project will be summed to the Euros you kept in your Purse. Therefore,
at the end, the amount of Euros in your Purse will be given by:
Your Purse = Euros kept + 0.5 x (amount re-transferred to the distribution software
by the Collector)
The earnings from the project of each person in the group are calculated in the same way. This
means that everyone receives the same earnings from the project.
For example, suppose that the sum of all contributions to the project is 10 Euros. In this case
everyone in the group earns 0.5*10=5 Euros from the project. If the sum of all contributions
to the project is instead 30 Euros, then each in the group will earn 0.5*30=15 Euros from the
project.
Each Euro you keep for yourself is directly put in your Purse. If instead you contributed that 1
Euro to the project, the total contribution to the project would then rise by one Euro, and your
earnings from the project would rise by 0.5*1=0.5 Euros.
Similarly, the earnings from the project of each other person in the group would also rise by
0.5 Euros each, so that the total earnings of the group would rise by 0.5*3=1.5 Euros. Your
contribution to the project therefore also raises the income of the others. Similarly, your earnings
increase for each Euro contributed by the others to the group project.
For each Euro contributed by any other person in your group you earn 0.5*1=0.5 Euros.
Now imagine that everyone contributes 10 Euros, so that the total amount collected by the
group is 30 Euros and everyone has 10 Euros in their Purses. The 30 Euros collected by the
group are transferred to the Collector’s Purse and added to the Euros he or she had kept for
herself. Hence, at this point, there are 40 Euros in the Collector’s Purse (what he or she had
kept plus what collected by the group). The Collector will then transfer the amount collected
by the group from his or her Purse to the distribution software, which will then give everyone
their earnings from the project: by entering 30, the software will distribute 0.5 x 30 = 15 Euros
to each person in the group. Hence, since everyone had contributed 10 Euros and kept 10 for
themselves, everyone earns 10 + 0.5 x 30 =25 Euros.
At the end of the session, the Euros you have in your Purse will be paid out to you at
the end of the session.
During the session, you will not receive information about what others in your group have done,
nor about your earnings until the very end of the session.
ONLY DISPLAYED TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE 50% EMBEZZLEMENT CONDITION
Notice that the software will perform random checks with a 50% probability on the amount
entered by the Collector in the distribution software. That is, in 50 cases out of 100, the
amount entered will not be checked. [That is, in 50 cases out of 100, the amount entered
will be checked.] If the amount entered by the Collector turns out to be different from what it
should be, he or she will be asked to correct the entry before proceeding further.
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ONLY DISPLAYED TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE 1% EMBEZZLEMENT CONDITION
Notice that the software will perform random checks with a 1% probability on the amount
entered by the Collector in the distribution software. That is, in 1 case out of 100, the
amount entered will not be checked. [That is, in 99 cases out of 100, the amount entered
will be checked.] If the amount entered by the Collector turns out to be different from what it
should be, he or she will be asked to correct the entry before proceeding further.
ONLY DISPLAYED TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE 0% EMBEZZLEMENT CONDITION
Notice that the software will perform random checks with a 100% probability on the amount
entered by the Collector in the distribution software. That is, in 0 cases out of 100, the
amount entered will not be checked. [That is, in 100 cases out of 100, the amount entered
will be checked.] If the amount entered by the Collector turns out to be different from what it
should be, he or she will be asked to correct the entry before proceeding further.
Do you have any questions? (If so, please, raise your hand)
Before starting the session, please take a few minutes to answer some control questions. These
are only meant for you to get familiar with the task and gauge your understanding, and will not
affect your earnings.
Control questions
Please answer the following control questions. They will help you to gain an understanding of
the calculation of your final Purse, which depends on your decision about how you distribute
your 20 Euros and with the decision of the others in your group. Please answer all the questions
and write down your calculations. The questions will be solved publicly in 10 minutes.
1. Everyone in your group has an endowment of 20 Euros. Assume that no one, including
you, contributes anything to the project.
a. What will your final Purse be? 20
b. What will the final Purse of the others be? 20
2. Everyone in your group has an endowment of 20 Euros. Assume that everyone, including
you, contributes all of their endowment to the project.
a. What will your final Purse be? 30
b. What will the final Purse of the others be? 30
3. Everyone in your group has an endowment of 20 Euros. The other 2 members contribute
a total of 30 Euros to the project.
a. What will your final Purse be, if you – in addition to the 30 Euros – contribute
0 Euros to the project? 35
b. What will your final Purse be, if you – in addition to the 30 Euros – contribute
8 Euros to the project? 31
c. What will your final Purse be, if you – in addition to the 30 Euros – contribute
14 Euros to the project? 28
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4. Everyone in your group has an endowment of 20 Euros. You contribute 8 Euros to the
project.
a. What will your final Purse be if the other group members – in addition to
your 8 Euros -contribute another 6 Euros in total to the project? 19
b. What will your final Purse be if the other group members – in addition to your
8 Euros – contribute another 12 Euros in total to the project? 22
c. What will your final Purse be if the other group members – in addition to
your 8 Euros – contribute another 22 Euros to the project? 27
Part II
You will now be paired with another participant from this session. Each of you will receive 6
Euros.
Your earnings in Part II will depend on your choice and on the choice of the other. One of you
will be randomly selected to be the “sender” and the other to be the “receiver”.
A pair of choices.
The sender will decide how much, if anything, of the 6 Euros to send to the receiver.
We will multiply the amount sent by a factor of 2. This way, if the sender sends 1 Euro, the
receiver will receive 2 Euros. If the sender sends 6 Euros, the receiver will receive 12 Euros.
The receiver can then decide how much, if anything, of the amount he or she has (the 6 Euros
plus the amount received) to send back to the sender.
After these two choices have been made, you will be re-matched with another participant, you
will be assigned the role you were not assigned the first time, and will repeat the choices. Hence
if you were assigned the role of “Sender” the first time you will be assigned that of “Receiver”,
and vice versa.
Hence, you will participate in the pair of choices twice, once as a sender and once as a receiver
in random order.
Attention: only one of the two pairs of choices will be randomly selected by the
software and be valid for payment in Part II. This can be either your choice as a
sender or that as a receiver, depending on which one is selected.
Do you have any questions? (If so, please, raise your hand)
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